Strict Liability in International Environmental Law by Shelton, Dinah L.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
Strict Liability in International Environmental Law 
Dinah L. Shelton 
George Washington University Law School, dshelton@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dinah L. Shelton & Alex Kiss, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law in LAW OF THE SEA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. 
MENSAH (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum, eds., Brill Academic Publishers, 2007). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
STRICT LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Alexandre Kiss† and Dinah Shelton
The principle that a State is responsible for causing environmental harm outside its territory in breach of  an international obligation has been slow to 
evolve to address the allocation of  loss due to accidents. The issue was not before 
the arbitral tribunal in the well-known dispute between the United States and 
Canada1 concerning the activities of  the Canadian smelter located in Trail, British 
Colombia. The arbitral tribunal asserted a general duty on the part of  a State 
to protect other States from injurious acts by individuals within its jurisdiction. 
The arbitral agreement itself  recognized the responsibility of  a State for the acts 
of  non-State actors as well as those of  the State or its organs. Summing up, the 
tribunal found that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of  its territory 
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of  another or 
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of  serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”.2
The tribunal noted dif!culty of  determining what constitutes an injurious act. 
Despite claims for absolute prohibition of  harmful activities, the tribunal agreed 
with national court precedents that States should take reasonable precautions 
to prevent harm, the same as those it would take to protect its own inhabitants. 
It may be concluded that a State’s failure to regulate or prevent serious harm 
from polluting activities, in instances where it would protect its own inhabitants, 
would constitute a wrongful act.
The Trail Smelter arbitration set the foundations for discussions of  responsibility 
and liability in environmental law3 but it left open the question of  whether a 
State exercising all due diligence would be liable if  transfrontier harm results 
despite the State’s best efforts. More generally, the tribunal did not clarify whether 
a State is liable only for intentional, reckless or negligent behavior (fault based 
1 1931-1941, 3 RIAA 1905.
2 3 RIAA 1938, 1965.
3 The case continues to be invoked. In 1972, Canada referred to the judgment when an oil 
spill in Washington polluted beaches in British Colombia. 11 CYIL 333-334 (1973).
Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah, 1131–1151
©2007 Koninklijke Brill NV. ISBN 978 90 04 16156 6. Printed in the Netherlands.
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conduct) or whether it is strictly liable for all serious or signi!cant transboundary 
environmental harm. In subsequent developments, international environmental 
law has come to distinguish responsibility, which arises upon breach of  an 
international obligation, and liability for the injurious consequences of  lawful 
activities. Progress towards clari!cation on this subject remains slow, however, 
as the following discussion demonstrates.4
I. State Responsibility
Following the Trail Smelter arbitration, the ICJ asserted a general duty to avoid 
transboundary injury in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, which referred to “every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used contrary to 
the rights of  other States”.5 The same year as this decision, the United Nations 
Survey of  International Law concluded that there is “general recognition of  the 
rule that a State must not permit the use of  its territory for purposes injurious to 
the interests of  other States in a manner contrary to international law”.6
Principle 21 of  the 1972 Stockholm Declaration restated the norm formulated 
in the Trail Smelter arbitration and other cases as follows:
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of  the United Nations and 
the principles of  international law … the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of  other States or of  areas beyond the limits of  national 
jurisdiction.” 
The rule was reiterated in Principle 2 of  the 1992 Rio Declaration and was again 
con!rmed in the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. It has also 
been reaf!rmed in declarations adopted by the United Nations, including the 
Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties of  States and the World Charter for Nature, 
and has been adopted by other international organizations and conferences.7 
4 On these topics, see T. Scovazzi, “State Responsibility for Environmental Harm”, 12 YB 
Int’l Envtl. L. 43 (2001); J.G. Lammers, “International Responsibility and Liability for 
Damage Caused by Environmental Interferences”, 31 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 42 (2001); R. 
Bratspies & R. Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law; Lessons from the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration (2006); G. Handl, “Transboundary Impacts”, in D. Bodansky, J. 
Brunnée & E. Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook of  International Environmental Law (2007); A. 
Boyle, “State Responsibility and International Liability For Injurious Consequences of  Acts 
Not Prohibited By International Law: A Necessary Distinction”, 39 ICLQ 1 (1990).
5 ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22.
6 UN Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1, at 34 (1949).
7 See e.g., Preliminary Declaration of  a Program of  Action of  the European Communities 
in respect to the Environment, OJEC C 112/1, 20 December 1973; Final Act, Conference 
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Its content is inserted in the Convention on the Law of  the Sea8 as well as in 
art. 20 of  the ASEAN Convention on the Conservation of  Nature and Natural 
Resources.9 The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution reproduces Principle 21 stating that the Principle “expresses the 
common conviction that States have” on this matter.
Principle 2 of  the Rio Declaration appears in the preamble of  the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and article 3 of  the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Finally, the International Court of  Justice recognized in an 
advisory opinion that “[t]he existence of  the general obligation of  states to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of  
other states or of  areas beyond national control is now part of  the corpus of  
international law relating to the environment”.10 This statement was repeated 
in the judgment concerning the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project, in which the Court 
also “recall[ed] that it has recently had occasion to stress … the great signi!cance 
that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for states but also for 
the whole of  mankind”.11
While Stockholm Principle 21 and similar formulations can be read to impose 
absolute State responsibility for any transfrontier harm, whether intentional or 
accidental, States generally have not invoked it to assert claims for accidental 
harm, however damaging the impact. The Chernobyl incident is a case in point.12 
Following the 26 April 1986 explosion in reactor Number 4 of  the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant, the resulting !re melted a portion of  the uranium fuel. 
Although there was no nuclear explosion and the core of  the reactor did not melt, 
the !re which engulfed the reactor was serious and released a large quantity of  
radioactive material into the air.
Large amounts of  fallout occurred near the plant and spread beyond. Between 
27 April and 8 May, nearly 50,000 persons were evacuated from towns located 
within a 30 kilometer radius of  the plant. Two persons were immediately killed 
by the explosion, 29 died shortly after, and hundreds were af"icted with radiation 
poisoning. The foreign consequences were also severe, even though no deaths 
were immediately attributed to the accident. Following rapid changes in the 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, August 1976.
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea, art. 194(2).
9 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of  Nature and Natural Resources (Kuala Lumpur, 
9 July 1985), 15 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 64 (1985).
10 Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 
241-242, para. 29.
11 Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 41, para. 53.
12 See L. Malone, “The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law Regulating 
State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution”, 12 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 203, 
222 (1987).
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wind direction, the radioactive cloud which had formed crossed the airspace of  
a series of  countries beginning with those of  Scandinavia. Four days after the 
incident, radiation measurements along the Swedish coast were ten times higher 
than normal. The radioactive cloud moved south, crossing Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Italy.
No conventional international regulation applied at the time the accident 
occurred in the Soviet Union. The interpretation then given to the Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution13 excluded pollution by radioactive 
elements. The USSR was not a contracting party to the Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.14 Indeed, among the States that suffered 
effects from the radioactive cloud, only Yugoslavia had signed and rati!ed the 
Convention. There remained, therefore, only the recourse to general rules of  
international environmental law and after consideration none of  the affected 
States presented a claim to the Soviet Union. 
States did request the Governing Council of  the IAEA to convene an extraordinary 
session with a group of  governmental experts in order to elaborate measures to 
reinforce international cooperation in the !eld of  nuclear security and radioac-
tive protection. This meeting took place in Vienna from 21 July to 15 August 
1986, and drafted two conventions which were adopted one month later by the 
IAEA General Conference. The Convention on Early Noti!cation of  a Nuclear 
Accident, signed 26 September, entered into force on 27 October; the Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of  a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency was 
signed the same day and also rapidly rati!ed by the signatories.
The instrument on assistance traces a general framework for cooperation 
between States on the one hand, and between the States and the IAEA on the 
other, in the case of  nuclear accident or other radiological emergency. It seems 
that the last term can be interpreted as covering any danger caused by radiation, 
whatever the cause, and includes nuclear arms testing. Had the Convention on 
Assistance existed at the time of  Chernobyl, any State exposed to radiation could 
have claimed assistance, whether or not the origin of  the accident or emergency 
was found within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control.15 It 
is clear, however, that States parties did not accept any obligation other than 
cooperating among themselves and with the Agency in order to facilitate early 
response.16
Apparently no government pushed to conclude rules on State liability 
for accidental environmental harm. Negotiations would no doubt have been 
lengthy and perhaps unsuccessful over such matters as proximate harm, and 
13 Geneva, 13 November 1979.
14 21 May 1963.
15 Art. 2, para. 1.
16 Art. 1, para. 1.
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mitigation of  damages. The dif!culty of  evaluating the cost of  the consequences 
of  the Chernobyl accident, especially the precautionary measures taken by the 
affected countries, also may have been a determinant factor in avoiding the issue 
of  State responsibility. It also seems, however, to be consistent with the general 
reticence displayed towards rules imposing strict liability on States for damages 
caused by that State or its citizens. The emphatic preference remains measures 
of  prevention rather than cure.
Finally, in August 2001, the International Law Commission completed its 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
which the UN General Assembly “took note of ” in Resolution 56/83 (December 
2001).17 According to article 2 of  the Draft Articles of  the International Law 
Commission, there is an internationally wrongful act of  a State when conduct 
consisting of  an action or omission constitutes a breach of  an international 
obligation of  the State. Article 3 adds that the characterization of  an act of  a State 
as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. In other words the 
primary rules of  conduct for States, i.e. their rights and duties, establish whether 
an act or omission constitutes a wrongful act. At present, as discussed in the 
next section, only a handful of  treaties make States strictly liable for any harm 
that occurs in another State’s territory as a result of  speci!c activities, even if  
the State has otherwise complied with its legal obligations. The large majority 
of  multilateral environmental treaties focus not on the harm to the injured 
State, but on the conduct of  the acting State, imposing duties of  comportment 
and of  result.
II. Strict Liability of  States in Environmental Agreements
Strict liability is foreseen in texts regulating activities considered as especially 
new or dangerous, such as the exploration and exploitation of  the outer space, 
and which are largely conducted by State actors. The Convention on Principles 
Governing the Activities of  States in the Exploration and Use of  Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,18 provides both for State 
responsibility and strict liability. First, article VI provides that the States Parties 
bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by 
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities. The activities of  non-
governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
17 The General Assembly recommended the articles to the attention of  Member States 
“without prejudice to the question of  their !nal adoption or other appropriate action”.
18 27 January 1967, International Environmental Law, Multilateral Treaties (EMUT) 
967:07.
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bodies, require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State, 
thus ensuring State involvement. Article VII adds that each State that launches 
or procures the launching of  an object into space and each State from whose 
territory or facility an object is launched, is liable to another State or to its natural 
or juridical persons for harm caused by such object, or its component parts, on 
the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies. Taken together, these two provisions distinguish between responsibility 
based on fault (art. VI) and strict liability for the injurious consequences of  space 
activities (art. VII).
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects19 develops these principles and gives several details concerning their 
implementation. According to its article II, a launching State is absolutely liable 
to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of  
the earth or to aircraft in "ight. Whenever two or more States jointly launch 
a space object, are jointly and severally responsible for any damage caused. A 
State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched shall be regarded 
as a participant in a joint launching. Exoneration from strict liability is granted 
to the extent that a launching State establishes that the damage has resulted 
from another’s gross negligence or from an intentional act or omission. No 
exoneration will be granted in cases where the damage has resulted from activities 
conducted by a launching State in breach of  international law. Nationals of  the 
launching State or foreign nationals participating in the launching cannot ask 
for compensation of  the damage caused by the launching State (art. VII).
A UN General Assembly resolution which proclaims several Principles 
Relevant to the Use of  Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space20 refers to the 
Space Treaty and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects:
“Each State which launches or procures the launching of  a space 
object and each State from whose territory or facility a space object 
is launched is internationally liable for damage caused by such space 
objects or their component parts. This fully applies to the case of  such a 
space object carrying a nuclear power source on board. Whenever two 
or more States jointly launch such an object, they shall be jointly and 
severally liable for any damage caused, in accordance with article V of  
the above-mentioned Convention.”
Such provisions establish a regime of  strict liability and not of  responsibility. 
Within the Antarctic system, efforts to conclude a liability annex to the 1991 
Madrid Protocol partially succeeded in June 2005, with conclusion of  a limited 
19 29 March 1972, EMUT, 972:24.
20 UNGA Res. A/47/68, 23 February1993 (32 ILM, 921).
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agreement on environmental emergencies, de!ned as any accidental event that 
takes place after the entry into force of  the Annex when the accident results in or 
imminently threatens signi!cant and harmful impact on the Antarctic environ-
ment. The agreement, adopted as Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection, will enter into force once all the present Consultative Parties have 
rati!ed it. 
The scope of  potential liability extends to all governmental and non-govern- 
mental activities for which advance notice is required under the Treaty, including 
tourism. The system is thus a “mixed” one of  liability for operators whether they 
are governmental or non-governmental actors. This is signi!cant because many 
activities in Antarctica are conducted or sponsored by governments. Each State 
party is to require its operators to undertake reasonable preventive measures, 
establish contingency plans for responses to incidents with potential adverse 
environmental impacts, and take prompt and effective responsive action when an 
emergency results from its activities. If  the operator fails to take response action, 
the relevant party is “encouraged” to take such action, as are other parties after 
notifying the party of  the operator, if  such noti!cation is feasible. Any operator 
that fails to take prompt and effective response action is liable to pay the costs 
of  response action taken by parties. Where the defaulting operator is a State 
operator and no party took response action, the State operator is liable to pay 
the equivalent of  the costs of  response action that should have been taken. This 
sum is paid into a fund.21
Liability is strict, but an operator will not be liable if  the operator proves that 
the emergency was caused by (1) an act or omission necessary to protect human 
life or safety; (2) an exceptional natural disaster which could not have been 
reasonably foreseen, provided all reasonable preventive measures have been taken; 
(3) an act of  terrorism; or (4) an act of  belligerency against the activities of  the 
operator. Sovereign immunity for warships is maintained, limits on liability are 
provided, and operators are to be required by each party to maintain adequate 
insurance or other !nancial security.
Residual State liability is also included in the Annex. Although article 10 is 
drafted in the negative, to assume no liability, it nonetheless sets forth circum-
stances in which a party will be held liable:
“A Party shall not be liable for the failure of  an operator, other than its 
State operators, to take response action to the extent that the Party took 
appropriate measures within its competence, including the adoption of  
21 Article 12 of  the Liability Annex mandates the Secretariat of  the Antarctic Treaty to 
maintain and administer a fund for the reimbursement of  the reasonable and justi!ed 
costs incurred by a party or parties in taking response actions to environmental emergen-
cies.
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laws and regulations, administrative actions and enforcement measures, 
to ensure compliance with this Annex.”
Although this article refers to liability, it seems to discuss State responsibility 
instead, because its focus is a State’s failure to comply with its legal obligations 
to take appropriate measures to prevent harm by non-State actors within its 
jurisdiction. Such omissions are often the basis of  claims against States under 
the law of  State responsibility.
III. The Development of  Norms on State Liability for Hazardous 
Lawful Activities
Since 1978, the International Law Commission has considered the question 
of  “international liability for injurious consequences arising out of  acts not 
prohibited by international law”. In 1997, the ILC decided to deal only with the 
question of  prevention of  transboundary damage from hazardous activities and 
within four years it was able to present to the UN General Assembly a completed 
set of  19 articles on this topic.22 The General Assembly reviewed the articles 
and, pressed by certain member States, asked the ILC to continue working 
on the topic of  international liability, “bearing in mind the interrelationship 
between prevention and liability…”.23 By July 2004 a draft set of  principles on 
Allocation of  Loss in the Case of  Transboundary Harm Arising Out of  Hazardous 
Activities was provisionally adopted by the Commission on !rst reading,24 and 
after comments by States, adopted on second reading in May 2006.25 To a large 
extent, these efforts can be seen to supplement and complete the ILC articles on 
Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Conduct,26 although the 
content of  the adopted rules appears largely to repudiate State liability when 
the State has complied with the Draft Articles on Prevention.
22 See Draft Articles on Prevention of  Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in 
Report of  the International Law Commission on the Work of  its Fifty-Third Session, UN 
GAOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, 370 (2001).
23 UN Doc. A/Res/56/82 of  18 January 2002.
24 UN Doc. A/59/10, 153-156.
25 See Draft Report of  the International Law Commission on the Work of  its Fifty-Eighth 
Session, Chapter V: International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of  
Acts not Prohibited by International Law (International Liability in Case of  Loss from 
Transboundary Harm Arising out of  Hazardous Activities), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.693/
Add.1, 9 June 2006.
26 Report of  the International Law Commission on the Work of  its Fifty-Third Session, UN 
GAOR, 55th Sess. Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
 Strict Liability in International Environmental Law
1139
The draft principles correctly approach the issue as one of  allocating the risk 
of  loss due to harm resulting from lawful economic or other activities, when 
the relevant State has complied with its due diligence obligations to prevent 
transboundary harm. The articles have merit in providing a general framework 
for States to adopt domestic law or conclude international agreements to ensure 
prompt and adequate compensation for the victims of  transboundary damage 
caused by lawful hazardous activities. It is also explicitly stated that an additional 
purpose of  the draft principles is “to preserve and protect the environment in the 
event of  transboundary damage, especially with respect to mitigation of  damage to 
the environment and its restoration and reinstatement”. This progressive principle 
should be read in the light of  the broad de!nitions of  damage,27 environment28 
and hazardous activity29 set forth in Principle 2. The last de!nition in particular 
extends strict liability considerably beyond that provided in most domestic law. 
While there is an important restriction in the exclusion of  harm to the commons 
from the scope of  these principles, on the whole they give a prominent place 
to the protection and preservation of  the environment per se for the bene!t of  
present and future generations. 
The draft principles support existing State practice, described in the following 
section, which largely channels liability to the owner or operator and demands 
!nancial guarantees against future harm. As with many existing environmental 
treaties, the Principles call for imposing strict liability on the operator or other 
person or entity and requiring !nancial security to cover claims of  compensation. 
In appropriate cases, industry-wide funds should be established at the national 
level.
The articles do not support strict liability between States, unless the State 
itself  is the operator.30 Principle 4(5) provides only that in the event that the 
measures for operator liability are insuf!cient, “the State of  origin should also 
ensure that additional !nancial resources are made available”. Other obliga-
tions are placed on the State, however. It must promptly notify all States that 
are potentially or actually affected, ensure that appropriate response measures 
27 In addition to personal and property losses, damage includes “loss or damage by impairment 
of  the environment, the costs of  reasonable measures of  reinstatement of  the environment, 
including natural resources, and the costs of  reasonable response measures” (Principle 
2(1)(iii-v)).
28 Environment includes natural resources, both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, 
fauna and "ora and the interaction between the same factors, and the characteristic 
aspects of  the landscape (Principle 2(b)).
29 In probably the broadest de!nition given in the draft articles, a hazardous activity “means 
an activity which involves a risk of  causing signi!cant harm” (Principle 2(c)).
30 The Commentary to the Draft Principles expressly States that “[i]t is envisaged that a State 
could be an operator for purposes of  the present de!nition”. UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.693/
Add.1, 41, para. 33.
IV. Environmental Law 
1140
are taken, and provide domestic remedies. Other measures are recommended, 
including consultation on measures of  mitigation, seeking the assistance of  
competent international organizations, and providing appropriate access to 
information on remedies. In addition, States may negotiate speci!c agreements 
on the topic of  strict liability. 
The lack of  any serious consideration of  State liability may be understood in 
the context of  the prior articles on prevention: failure to ful!ll the due diligence 
duty to prevent is considered to breach an international obligation and shifts the 
applicable legal regime to one of  State responsibility. Still, to dismiss liability as 
“a case of  misplaced priority”31 ignores existing positive law which, as described 
above, has accepted the principle of  State liability without fault in a series of  
treaties concerning ultrahazardous activities that are largely conducted by 
State actors.
These are clearly circumstances in which the primary obligation of  a State is 
to ensure/insure that harm does not occur. Nonetheless, the ILC appears to have 
decided that strict liability of  States does not even have support as a measure of  
progressive development in the law.32 Instead, the ILC limits itself  to noting that 
certain categories of  hazardous activities might be included in treaties providing 
for State-funded compensation schemes to supplement civil liability. It stops well 
short of  !nding that such compensation is legally required.
Strict liability of  States thus remains very controversial and the preference 
is clearly in favor of  imposing civil liability on operators. Those subject matters 
for which State liability has been accepted in practice uphold this preference 
because they largely concern activities typically undertaken by government 
actors, at least until recently: e.g. outer space exploration and exploitation and 
Antarctic scienti!c research. States seem willing to accept liability for their own 
conduct, but not for that of  private actors.
IV. Strict Liability of  Non-State Actors
Treaties related to environmental protection include clauses establishing strict 
liability of  individuals. In interstate relations such liability is linked with speci!ed 
activities, considered as potentially damaging for the environment. Current 
treaties on civil liability number about one dozen, nearly all of  them concerned 
with a single hazardous activity (e.g. nuclear energy or oil transport). Several 
conventions address vessel-source marine pollution or nuclear damage, while 
31 P.S. Rao, First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of  Loss in Case of  Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of  Hazardous Activities, UN Doc. A/CN.4/531 (2003), 7.
32 P.S. Rao, Third Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of  Loss in Case of  Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of  Hazardous Activities, UN Doc. A/CN.4/566 (2006), para. 31.
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pollution from offshore oil and gas exploitation, carriage of  dangerous goods 
by various means of  transport, and transboundary movements of  hazardous 
wastes are each regulated by a single treaty.
Three nuclear liability treaties adopted in the 1960s aim partly to protect 
potential victims and partly to insulate nuclear industry from devastating claims. 
The 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of  Nuclear Energy 
(Paris Convention)33 was concluded in the context of  OECD. It was intended 
to provide uni!ed rules for adequate and equitable compensation while still 
supporting development of  nuclear energy. The Paris Convention has not been 
widely rati!ed, nor have other agreements in this !eld been broadly accepted. 
There are no known transnational claims brought to date based on the Paris 
Convention, although some national claims34 have been based on legislation 
implementing the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention was later enhanced 
in 1963 with a Supplementary Convention (Brussels).35 Protocols amending the 
Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention were adopted in 
February 2004,36 broadening the concept of  nuclear damage and the geographic 
scope of  the Convention. However, environmental damage on the high seas or 
deep seabed remains excluded.
The Paris Convention became linked to a 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage37 by a Joint Protocol adopted in 1988 and by the 
1997 Protocol of  Amendment.38 The 1997 Amended Vienna Convention provides 
that it in principle applies to nuclear damage wherever suffered, with limited 
exclusions. These conventions take the same approach to liability: 
 – Liability is channeled exclusively to the operators of  the nuclear installa-
tions; 
 – Liability of  the operator is strict, i.e. the operator is held liable irrespective 
of  fault;
33 55 AJIL 1082 (1961).
34 E.g. Merliun v. British Nuclear Fuels, (1990) 3 All ER 711.
35 The Supplementary Convention allows compensation beyond the liability limits of  the 
Paris Convention. All claims must be brought in the State where the incident occurred if  
there is one and if  not then the territory of  the installation or the operator liable. Claims 
must normally be brought within ten years of  the date of  the incident and awards are 
enforceable in any State party. Eleven States are parties to the Supplementary Conven-
tion. 
36 Protocol of  12 Feb. 2004 amending the 1960 Paris Convention; Protocol of  12 Feb. 2004 
amending the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention.
37 2 ILM 727 (1963).
38 36 ILM 1462 (1997).
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 – The amount of  liability is limited, although the limits may be raised or 
removed if  fault is shown;39
 – Liability is limited in time;40
 – The operator must maintain insurance or other !nancial security for an 
amount corresponding to his liability; if  such security is insuf!cient, the 
installation State is obliged to make up the difference up to the limit of  
the operator’s liability;
 – Jurisdiction over actions lies exclusively with the courts of  the Contracting 
Party in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred; and
 – A guarantee of  non-discrimination of  victims on the grounds of  nationality, 
domicile or residence is provided.
In 1988, as a result of  efforts by the IAEA and OECD/NEA, a new Joint Protocol 
Relating to the Application of  the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention 
combined them into one expanded liability regime. Parties to the Joint Protocol 
are treated as though they were Parties to both Conventions and a choice of  law 
rule determines which of  the two Conventions should apply to the exclusion of  
the other in respect of  the same incident. 
The 1997 Protocol41 sets the possible limit of  the operator’s liability for a 
single nuclear incident at not less than 300 million Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) (equivalent to USD 400 million). The Amended Paris Convention changed 
the unit of  account to the euro and more than doubled the minimum amount 
to at least 700 million euro. The 1997 Protocol also rede!ned nuclear damage 
to include the concept of  environmental damage and preventive measures, 
extended the geographical scope of  the Vienna Convention, and extended the 
39 The Vienna Convention does not !x an upper ceiling for compensation, while the Paris 
Convention sets a maximum liability of  15 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The 
Brussels Supplementary Convention established additional funding beyond the amount 
available under the Paris Convention up to a total of  300 million SDRs, consisting of  
contributions by the installation State and contracting parties.
40 Originally, compensation rights were extinguished under the Paris and Vienna Conventions 
if  an action was not brought within ten years from the date of  the nuclear incident. Longer 
periods were permissible if, under the law of  the installation State, the liability of  the 
operator is covered by !nancial security. National law may establish a shorter time limit, 
but not less than two years (the Paris Convention) or three years (the Vienna Convention) 
from the date the claimant knew or ought to have known of  the damage and the operator 
liable. The Amended Conventions extend the statute of  limitations with respect to loss of  
life or personal injury from ten to thirty years.
41 Two instruments were in fact signed: the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention, 
36 ILM 1462 (1997) and a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage, 36 ILM 1473 (1997).
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period during which claims may be brought for loss of  life and personal injury. 
It also provides for jurisdiction of  coastal States over actions incurring nuclear 
damage during maritime transport. In addition, a 1971 Convention relating to 
Civil Liability in the Field of  Maritime Carriage of  Nuclear Material42 provided 
for shipowner liability if  the shipowner committed or omitted an act with intent 
to cause damage. 
Even more than nuclear operations, environmental injury caused by marine 
oil pollution is regulated by an entire system based on the 1969 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution as modi!ed in 1971, 1976, 1984 
and 199243 together with the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of  an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, also modi!ed by 
protocols, the latest being adopted in 2003.44 The 1969 Convention established 
the liability of  the owner of  a ship45 for pollution damage caused by oil escaping 
from the ship as a result of  an incident on the territory of  a party. Other marine 
liability conventions include the 1976 International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from the Exploration for or Exploitation of  
Seabed Mineral Resources,46 the 1996 International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of  Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention),47 and the 2001 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage.48
42 11 ILM 277 (1972).
43 In contrast to the treaty system, some States, notably the US, have enacted national 
legislation with much higher limits of  liability, including some contexts in which liability 
is unlimited. See Oil Pollution Act of  1990, Public Law 101-380, enacted following the 
Exxon Valdez disaster of  1989.
44 IMO Doc. 92 FUNA/A.8/4.
45 The owner of  the ship is not responsible if  he can prove that the damage resulted from an 
act of  war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of  an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistible character. The same is true if  the damage results from an act or 
omission of  a third party done with intent to cause damage or results from the negligence or 
other wrongful act of  any government or other authority responsible for the maintenance 
of  lights or other navigational aids.
46 17 December 1976, 16 ILM 1451 (1977). 
47 3 May 1996, 35 ILM 1415 (1996); IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.10/8/2 (9 May 1996). The HNS 
treaty system of  liability is similar to the 1992 oil pollution agreement, imposing strict 
liability for damage caused. It has a wide de!nition of  hazardous and noxious substances, 
excluding nuclear materials. Insurance is required and liability is limited on a sliding scale 
depending on the size of  the ship. A second tier of  compensation applies when shipowner 
not liable because the incident falls within the treaty’s exceptions or the owner has no 
reason to know of  the nature of  the substances being transported, or where the claim 
exceeds the liability limits. A fund is created, !nanced by levies on the importation of  HNS 
cargoes.
48 23 March 2001, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/DC/1.
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The Oil Pollution Convention de!nes pollution as “loss or damage caused 
outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or 
discharge of  oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and 
includes the cost of  preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures”. While the 1969 Convention applied to incidents wherever 
occurring, article 3 of  the 1992 Protocol speci!ed that the Convention covers only 
damage suffered in the territory, the territorial sea or the EEZ of  a Contracting 
State. The Convention also applies to preventive measures, wherever taken, to 
prevent or minimize such damage, including environmental damage. It states, 
however, that compensation for impairment of  the environment other than loss 
of  pro!t from such impairment shall be limited to costs of  reasonable measures 
of  reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken.49 The owner may 
limit liability except in case of  actual fault and must maintain insurance or other 
!nancial security to cover its liability. 
Strict liability for maritime pollution was extended to other hazardous 
substances in 1996 with the adoption of  the HNS Convention.50 The Convention 
covers claims for damage arising from the carriage of  such substances at sea, 
i.e. that period during which the substances are on the ship or ship’s equipment. 
Article 1(6) of  the HNS Convention de!nes damage to include, in addition to loss 
of  life or personal injury or the loss of  or damage to property, loss or damage by 
contamination of  the environment caused by hazardous and noxious substances, 
provided that compensation for impairment of  the environment other than 
loss of  pro!t from such impairment shall be limited to the costs of  reasonable 
measures of  reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken, and the 
costs of  preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive 
measures.
The marine pollution system balances strict liability with limits on liability. 
The Protocol of  1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of  Liability for 
49 Art. 8(2) of  the Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities Convention which never entered 
into force also provided for strict liability for damages “in the event that there has been 
no restoration to the status quo ante”. The Council of  Europe rules on compensation for 
damage caused to the environment include among the de!nitions given in article 2(9): 
“‘Measures of  reinstatement’ means any appropriate and reasonable measures aiming 
to reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed natural resources or where appropriate or 
reasonable to introduce the equivalent of  these resources into the environment.” In all 
cases, restoring the environment to its status quo ante is the preferred remedy and this is 
especially true where it is dif!cult to assess the harm and the corresponding compensa-
tion. Only when restoration is not possible would it then be necessary to measure the 
damages.
50 For a similar strict liability regime, see the earlier Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Caused during Carriage of  Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels 
of  10 October 1989.
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Maritime Claims of  19 November 1976,51 established a ceiling de!ned by IMF 
special withdrawal rights.52 The Protocol differentiates between types of  claims. 
Claims for loss of  life or personal injury have a minimum limit of  two million 
Units of  Account, a limit which increases with the tonnage of  the involved 
ship. In respect of  any other claim the minimum is one million units which is 
augmented following the same method. For States which are not members of  
the IMF the corresponding amounts are respectively 30 million and 15 million 
monetary units (art. 8(2)).
A claim of  compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly 
against the insurer or other persons providing !nancial security for the owner’s 
liability for pollution damage. In order to bene!t from the limitation on liability, 
the owner must deposit the sum representing the limit of  his liability with the 
court or other authority with jurisdiction. If  liability is found, the fund is then 
distributed among the claimants in proportion to their established claims.53 
The owner of  a ship registered in a contracting State and carrying more than 
2,000 tons of  oil in bulk as cargo must maintain insurance or other !nancial 
guarantee of  compensation in case of  liability for pollution damage. An insurance 
or guarantee certi!cate must be issued to each ship by the appropriate national 
authority and contracting States are obliged to prevent a ship from trading 
unless the appropriate certi!cate has been issued. Each State must recognize 
the certi!cates issued by other contracting States.
The 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of  an International 
fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, as modi!ed, aims to assure 
payment of  compensation for pollution damage to the extent that protection 
afforded by the Liability Convention proves insuf!cient. The Fund is required 
to pay compensation to any person suffering pollution damage if  the person 
is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation for the damage under the 
terms of  the Liability Convention, either because no liability arises under the 
treaty, because the owner is !nancially incapable of  payment, or because the 
damage exceeds the owner’s liability under the Convention. However, the total 
amount of  damages that the Fund will pay is also limited, to 135 million Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR). This ceiling can be raised to 200 million for certain 
polluting accidents.54 Contributions to the Fund are made by any person who 
has received total quantities of  oil in excess of  150,000 tons during the prior 
calendar year.55
51 2 May 1996, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.10/8 (9 May 1996).
52 Protocol art. 2(2).
53 Arts 5(3) and 5(4).
54 Art. 4(4)(c).
55 Art. 10.
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The system has been active. Between 1971 and 2000, the Fund paid out 
nearly 300 million British pounds sterling with respect to 102 incidents.56 The 
system also continues to evolve. As a result of  the marine disasters concerning 
the Nakhodka in 1997 and the Erika in 1999, the 2004 Protocol established 
a new international body, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Sup-
plementary Fund, and created an optional third tier above those provided by the 
Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Convention. The Supplementary Fund, 
to be !nanced by oil receivers, will increase the aggregate available amount to 
750 million SDR for any one incident.
The 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage addresses the category of  vessels responsible for the majority of  oil spills. 
In contrast to earlier conventions dealing with damage caused by the cargo of  
relatively small and well-de!ned categories of  vessels, the Bunker Convention 
potentially applies to all ships, de!ned as “any seagoing vessel and seaborne 
craft whatsoever”. Bunker oil means “any hydrocarbon mineral oil, including 
lubricating oil, used or intended to be used for the operation or propulsion of  
the ship, and any residues of  such oil”. The de!nition of  “pollution damage” is 
identical to that of  the 1992 Convention on Civil Liability. It is also subject to the 
same limitation in that it does not cover damage to the environment in itself, but 
only clean-up costs and the loss of  pro!t suffered by victims such as !shermen 
and local industries dependant on ocean resources and the tourist trade. Actions 
for compensation may only be brought in the courts of  the States where damage 
was suffered. Ships must carry certi!cates attesting to their !nancial security 
and claims for compensation may be made directly against the insurer or other 
provider of  !nancial security.
Unlike other treaties, the Bunker Oil Convention does not channel liability 
to a single person but de!nes ship owner to include others who have joint and 
several liability However, only the registered owner of  a ship over 1,000 gross 
tonnage is required to provide !nancial security. The regulation of  mutual 
liability is left to national law. Article 6 provides that the ship owner may limit 
liability “under any applicable national or international regime”, such as the 
1976 Convention on Limitation of  Liability for Maritime Claims.57 Under this 
Convention, the limits of  liability are on a sliding scale depending on the size 
of  the ship. A 1996 protocol, not in force in 2006, will raise the limits. In any 
case, the reference to national and international law means a lack of  uniformity 
in liability limits for oil spills from non-tanker vessels. While it was proposed 
to exclude from liability any person taking reasonable measures to prevent or 
minimize the effects of  oil pollution, no agreement was reached to include such 
56 See International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Annual Report for 2000, 37-40.
57 16 ILM 606 (1977).
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a provision. Instead, the conference recommended legal provisions for such 
persons in domestic laws.58
For land-based activities, a Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Dam-
age resulting from Transboundary Movements of  Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal59 has further developed the regime of  civil liability for environmental 
damage. Its purpose is to provide a comprehensive regime for liability and for 
adequate and prompt compensation for damage resulting from transboundary 
waste movements, including illegal traf!c. It de!nes damage broadly to include 
loss of  income directly deriving from an economic interest in any use of  the 
environment, when that loss is incurred as a result of  impairment of  the environ-
ment. Compensation extends to the cost of  measures of  reinstatement of  the 
impaired environment, limited to the costs of  measures actually taken or to be 
undertaken and the costs of  preventive measures, including any loss or damage 
caused by such measures. Preventive measures are de!ned as any reasonable 
measures taken by any person in response to an incident to prevent, minimize, 
or mitigate loss or damage, or to affect environmental clean-up. The Protocol 
applies to damage due to an incident occurring during a transboundary move-
ment of  hazardous wastes and other wastes and their disposal, including illegal 
traf!c, in particular in relation to movements destined for disposal operations 
speci!ed in Annex IV of  the 1989 Basel Convention (art. 3). The Basel Protocol 
imposes strict liability on, !rst, the person who provides noti!cation of  a proposed 
transboundary movement according to article 6 of  the Basel Convention, and, 
thereafter, the disposer of  the wastes. Liability for damage is subject to !nancial 
limits speci!ed in article 12(1) and Annex B to the Protocol. During the ten year 
period of  liability, those potentially liable shall establish and maintain insurance 
or other !nancial guarantees. Liability limits are removed if  the responsible 
person causes or contributes to causing damage by failure to comply with the 
provisions implementing the Basel Convention, or due to wrongful intentional, 
reckless or negligent acts or omissions. 
The Protocol imposes upon the Contracting Parties the obligation to adopt 
the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures necessary to implement 
the Protocol and to inform the Secretariat of  the Protocol of  the measures it 
has taken. For the rest, the Protocol shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of  the Contracting Parties under the rules of  general international law with 
respect to State responsibility. The competent jurisdictions are the courts of  the 
State where the damage was suffered or the incident occurred or the defendant 
has his habitual residence or has his principal place of  business. All matters of  
substance or procedure regarding claims before the competent court shall be 
58 See IMO Resolution on the Protection of  Persons Taking Measures to Prevent or Minimize 
the Effects of  Oil Pollution, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/18.
59 Basel, 10 December 1999.
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governed by the law of  that court. Enforceable judgments thus handed down 
shall be mutually recognized and enforced.
A regional model for comprehensive civil liability is the Lugano Convention 
on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from the Exercise of  Activities Dangerous 
for the Environment.60 It establishes general standards for indemni!cation of  
those injured by hazardous activities and products. The Convention broadly 
imposes responsibility on all persons and companies and State and all agencies 
exercising control over dangerous activities, irrespective of  the place of  the 
harm. However, if  the damage occurs in a non-contracting State, the Convention 
permits reservations to be !led demanding reciprocity of  remedies.
The Convention applies to dangerous activities and substances, including 
living modi!ed organisms. The quality of  dangerousness is largely based upon 
assessment of  the risk of  harm to man, the environment or property. Nuclear 
damage is excluded if  the incident is regulated by the Paris Convention on Civil 
Liability of  1960 or by the Vienna Convention of  1963 with its amendments, or 
by national legislation at least as favorable to the plaintiffs as the Conventions. 
Workplace accidents covered by social security and automobile accidents in 
places inaccessible to the public as well as assimilated to other activities within 
the installation also are excluded.
In addition to compensation for death, bodily harm, and injury to property 
other than that found on the site or within the installation where the dangerous 
activity has taken place, recovery can be had for environmental harm,61 limited to 
the costs of  reasonable measures taken to restore or rehabilitate the environment 
to its prior State. Recovery is also possible for the costs of  mitigating measures 
and any losses or damage caused by such measures after an incident or event. 
The maximum amount of  liability may be !xed by local law, which should also 
insist upon adequate insurance coverage taking into account the risks associated 
with the activity.
Anyone who is in control of  a dangerous activity is responsible for damages 
caused by that activity.62 The problem of  multiple or long-term sources is solved 
imposing joint responsibility and by placing the burden of  proof  on the various 
persons who were in control of  the activity or activities to prove they were not 
responsible. In cases where the activity has ceased when the damage occurs, the 
60 21 June 1993, 32 ILM 1228 (1993).
61 For these purposes, environment is broadly de!ned to include biotic and abiotic natural 
resources, such as air, water, soil, fauna and "ora, the interaction between them, cultural 
property and characteristic aspects of  the countryside.
62 States parties may reserve to the basic principle of  liability, to the extent of  allowing 
the defendant to escape liability if  it can show that the state of  scienti!c and technical 
knowledge at the moment of  the incident was insuf!cient to indicate the dangerous 
properties of  the substance or the organism.
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last person in control will be liable unless he can show that the causative event 
took place before he was in control.
Liability is not imposed if  damage occurs as a result of  armed con"ict, a 
natural disaster, an intentional act of  a third party, a State command, “pollution 
of  a level acceptable having regard to the relevant local circumstances”, or if  
the activity was taken for the bene!t of  the person damaged, to the extent it was 
reasonable for the latter to be exposed to the risks of  the dangerous activity, or 
if  the injured party was at fault. 
From the perspective of  the plaintiff, there are several favorable provisions. 
Article 10 provides that in examining the proof  of  causality, a judge in any case 
falling within the terms of  the Convention should take into account the probable 
risk of  damage inherent in the dangerous activity in question. Moreover, the 
time limits for claims are rather long. According to article 18, actions should be 
brought within !ve years of  the date on which the plaintiff  knew or reasonably 
should have known of  the damage and of  the identity of  the person in control. 
No action may be brought more than 30 years after the causative event or the 
last in a series of  causative events. For waste disposal sites, the !nal date is 30 
years from the closure of  the site. Forum selection is also made possible: article 
20 permits the action to be !led either in the courts of  a State party where 
the damage occurred, where the dangerous activity took place, or where the 
defendant has its permanent residence.
Injunctive relief  may be sought by environmental associations in the courts 
where the dangerous activity takes place, on conditions set by internal law. 
States may declare at signature, rati!cation, or accession that this possibility 
will be open to non-governmental organizations based in other States parties. 
Environmental groups may demand prohibition of  any illegal dangerous activity 
threatening serious environmental harm as well as injunctions against the person 
in control of  a dangerous activity, in order to require preventive or remedial 
actions be taken. Where remedial action is sought, the courts of  the State where 
the action should be taken also have jurisdiction over the case. Public authorities 
have the right to intervene when environmental groups bring actions. Article 
19 is explicitly subject to reservations.
All judgments rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction according to the 
Convention are entitled to be recognized in other States parties unless they are 
contrary to public order, the defendant was not properly noti!ed of  the action 
in time to prepare a defense, or if  the decision is irreconcilable with a decision 
rendered between the same parties (res judicata). 
Finally, the Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused 
by the Transboundary Effects of  Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters 
was formally adopted and signed by 22 countries at the Ministerial Conference 
“Environment for Europe” in Kiev, Ukraine, on 21 May 2003. It is a Joint 
Protocol to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of  Transboundary 
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Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of  Industrial Accidents. 
The Protocol gives individuals affected by the transboundary impact of  
industrial accidents on international watercourses a legal claim for adequate 
and prompt compensation. Companies will be liable for accidents at industrial 
installations, including tailing dams, as well as during transport via pipelines. 
Physical damage, damage to property, loss of  income, the cost of  reinstatement 
and response measures are covered by the Protocol. The Protocol sets !nancial 
limits of  liability depending on the risk of  the activity, i.e. the quantities of  
the hazardous substances that are or may be present and their toxicity or the 
risk they pose to the environment. To cover this liability, companies will have 
to establish !nancial securities, such as insurance or other guarantees. The 
Protocol establishes a principle of  non-discrimination among victims: victims 
of  the transboundary effects cannot be treated less favorably than victims from 
the country where the accident has occurred.
In sum, several common traits are found in the liability agreements:
 (a)  Identi!cation of  the polluter is assured through a presumption which 
channels responsibility. Thus, in case of  damage, the responsibility 
automatically is imputed to the exploiter or the ship owner.
 (b)  The system of  liability is settled by imposing strict liability for damage, 
but specifying a limited set of  excuses.
 (c)  Jurisdictional competence is determined by designating the proper forum, 
in some cases that of  the plaintiff, in other cases that of  the polluter or in 
permitting the victim the free choice of  tribunal. 
 (d)  Time limits are imposed. The Lugano Convention makes it three years from 
the date of  knowledge or the time when the plaintiff  reasonably should 
have known of  the damage and the identity of  the operator. An absolute 
bar to suit is imposed after thirty years.
 (e)  Liability limits are coupled with mandatory insurance requirements.
 (f)  The execution of  judgments is assured.
It must be noted, in conclusion, that some of  the eleven major liability treaties 
are not in force, because many States oppose the limits on liability that these 
agreements contain. The Lugano Convention has not been rati!ed by any State 
as of  October 2006. The HNS Convention has only 8 parties, the Bunker Oil 
Convention has 11 rati!cations, and the Nuclear Carriage Convention has 17 
parties. The 1992 Amended Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, the 
most widely accepted Convention, has 114 parties, followed by the 1992 Amended 
Fund Agreement which has 98 adherents. The fact of  holdout States in turn 
discourages others from accepting what becomes an unequal burden-sharing.
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Limited liability originated in maritime law, in recognition of  the value of  
maritime transport and the hazards of  shipping, but some see it today as an 
unwarranted subsidy at the expense of  other interests and as undermining the 
polluter pays principle.63 Those favoring limited liability respond that unlimited 
damage awards could drive responsible shipowners out of  business.64 It is also 
argued that unlimited liability will make maritime transport uninsurable. In 
fact, liability limits have been set in large part according to insurance industry 
indications, rather than degree of  risk and needs of  victims. The problems are 
political and practical rather than principled.
V. Conclusion
As a rule, strict liability is linked with hazardous activities and States draft laws 
or regulations to identify such activities. States appear hesitant to accept inter-
national rules that would oblige them to restrict or accept liability for activities 
whose harmful environmental consequences are likely to be limited to their own 
territory; in this respect economic interests play a major political role. There are 
speci!c activities, however, which present a signi!cant risk for the environment 
of  the commons or of  other States. Environmental damage from nuclear activities 
and marine pollution, in particular, may escape the territorial limits of  States 
and cause transboundary damage to persons and/or to the environment. While 
international law has been slow in placing the risk of  loss on the actor pro!ting 
from the enterprise, economic globalization potentially could lead to progress by 
harmonizing the conditions of  operation in certain !elds of  activities dangerous 
to human health and to the environment.
63 See G. Gauci, “Limitation of  Liability in Maritime Law: An Anachronism?”, 19 Marine 
Policy 65 (1995).
64 See R.R. Churchill, “Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for Environmental 
Damage by Means of  Treaties: Problems and Progress”, 12 YB Int’l Envtl. L. 3, 35-36 
(2001).
